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Abstract
Formal epistemologists criticise the Conciliatory View of peer disagreement for being
non-commutative with conditionalisation, path dependent and does not preserve the
independence between propositions. Failing to commute with conditionalisation, one
may switch the order between conciliating and conditionalising and obtain different
outcomes. Failing to be path independent, the outcome of conciliation varies with
the order of the acquisition of new testimonies. Failing to preserve the independence
between propositions, one may suffer from a sure-loss and hence be deemed irra-
tional. The three formal deficiencies urge people to abandon the Conciliatory View.
This paper aims to show that one may save the Conciliatory View by conciliating
with nonlinear functions. Research in the study of opinion pooling shows that the
three deficiencies are not problems of the Conciliatory View, but problems of linear
averaging. Hence, one can get rid of these formal deficiencies by making conciliation
with nonlinear averaging functions. After showing how the three deficiencies can be
avoided, I will explore the features of nonlinear averaging functions and argue that
they have properties that correctly capture people’s intuition concerning disagreement.
The conclusion, therefore, is to suggest epistemologists develop a more fine-grained
taxonomy for cases of disagreement. With a deliberate categorisation of different kinds
of disagreement, epistemologists can pick the proper averaging rule to apply in each
specific case, and get rid of possible formal deficiencies.
Keywords Formal epistemology · Social epistemology · Opinion pooling · Peer
disagreement · Nonlinear averaging
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1 Introduction
The Conciliatory View of peer disagreement holds that when one disagrees with their
epistemic peers, one should compromise with their peers by revising their credence
in the proposition at issue (Christensen 2007; Elga 2007; Feldman 2006).1 Despite its
intuitive plausibility, many epistemologists find this view untenable. Some claim that
conciliating is a self-abasing act (Pettit 2006; van Inwagen 1996), while others argue
that it is not truth-conducive (Kelly 2010). Among the arguments against the Concil-
iatory View, the ones that focus on its formal deficiencies deserve special attention. It
has been pointed out that there are three deficiencies in the Conciliatory View. First, it
does not commute with the Bayesian rule of conditionalisation since the outcome of
conciliation is partially determined by whether one updates before making conciliation
(Fitelson and Jehle 2009; Wilson 2010). Second, the Conciliatory View is path depen-
dent (Gardiner 2014). In a case where one makes multiple conciliations with their
peers at different times, the final result is determined by the temporal order in which
one makes the conciliations with each peer. Third, the Conciliatory View does not
preserve one’s judgement concerning the relevance between propositions (Elkin and
Wheeler 2018). That is, one’s judgement that two propositions are irrelevant may not
be well preserved after they conciliates with others. Since all three features bring about
some unacceptable consequences, the Conciliatory View seems seriously flawed.
The criticisms concerning the formal deficiencies of the Conciliatory View, how-
ever, are misguided. Studies in opinion pooling have shown that it is linear averaging,
the function that is generally adopted to make conciliation, that has the three formal
deficiencies. Since linear averaging is by no means the only legitimate way to make
conciliation, one can save the Conciliatory View by adopting nonlinear average func-
tions. To show this, I will first introduce the Conciliatory View and its most prominent
form, the Equal Weight view. After reformulating the two views in a formal frame-
work, I will demonstrate the three formal deficiencies of the Conciliatory View and
explain how can they be solved by making conciliation with geometric and multi-
plicative average functions. To further justify the approach of nonlinear conciliation,
I will point out that some features of the nonlinear average functions better reflect our
intuitions about disagreement. As a result, some misconceptions in the study of peer
disagreement may be clarified. The conclusion, hence, is that we should embrace a
pluralistic view concerning conciliation and give up the idea that there is a single con-
ciliating rule which can be applied in every case of peer disagreement. Conciliationists
should develop a taxonomy of different kinds of disagreement and find out the proper
average function to apply for each kind.
2 Disagreement between peers
Consider the following scenario: Albert, a brilliant historian who specialises in the
Victorian era, wants to solve the mystery of Jack the Ripper. Having spent years
1 The formulation here involves the notion of credence. I will provide a reason for formulating this way in
Sect. 3.
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reviewing all the evidence relevant to the Whitechapel murders, he becomes very
confident that it was the Polish barber Aaron Kosminski who committed the atrocity.
However, his colleague Bridget firmly believes the opposite. Like Albert, Bridget is
also an expert in Victorian Britain who has reviewed all the evidence related to the
murders. Unlike Albert, Bridget considers it extremely unlikely that Kosminski is Jack
the Ripper. Knowing that Bridget, as a historian, is as good as himself, how should
Albert respond to their disagreement concerning this controversy?
Albert and Bridget’s case is a typical example of peer disagreement. Two symmetric
assumptions need to be highlighted for one to see why these kinds of circumstances
constitute a real problem for epistemologists. First, since it is assumed that Bridget
is Albert’s epistemic peer, they are symmetric with their reliability concerning this
issue. We may unpack this assumption a bit further by assuming that Albert and Bridget
were both educated in prestigious universities, trained in similar ways and had equally
outstanding track records. Given these conditions, they are equally likely to have the
correct credence concerning the historical fact in question with the same body of
evidence. Precisely because of such peerhood, any reason which allows Albert to cast
doubt on Bridget’s credences concerning specific historical facts should also allow
Bridget to cast doubt on Albert’s credences. Hence, Albert cannot dismiss Bridget’s
disagreement but must take it seriously. Second, they are symmetric with the evidence
they possess respectively. The evidence Albert has is to a great extent, if not exactly,
identical to the evidence Bridget has.2 Because of the parity of evidence between them,
one cannot expect either of them to change their mind after reviewing the evidence
available to themselves. It is the two symmetries that make peer disagreement a thorny
problem for social epistemologists.
There are many variants of the standard peer disagreement case that can be generated
by revising the two symmetric assumptions. Regarding the symmetry of reliability, one
may specify the reliability of the interlocutors involved. When all the interlocutors are
highly reliable, we have the case of expert disagreement. On the contrary, when all the
interlocutors are unreliable, we have the case of layperson disagreement. Regarding
the symmetry of evidence, one may assume different degrees of information they have
concerning the evidence their peers possess. In some cases, all the interlocutors are
fully aware that others have the same body of evidence as they do. Each of them not
only knows that the other interlocutors do possess some evidence but also knows the
content of the evidence. In a slightly different case, the interlocutors do not share
the full content of the evidence. What they know is that all the interlocutors possess
evidence of the same strength.3 If we relax the notion of peerhood further, we may
derive cases in which the interlocutors know that the other interlocutors have some
pieces of evidence, but have no information concerning the strength of the evidence
others possess. The most radical case would be one where each interlocutor has no
idea whether their peers have any piece of evidence. Due to the highly varied nature
of all these different kinds of cases, they should be treated in different ways.
2 Some epistemologists consider cases in which the individuals have pieces of evidence that are only
accessible to themselves. Here it is assumed that this kind of evidence does not play a crucial role in their
judgement.
3 This definition of peer disagreement can be found in Matheson (2014).
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One may doubt whether these variants still count as peer disagreement, especially
cases of the latter kind in which the symmetry of evidence is weakened. Indeed,
without assuming the symmetry of evidence, the problem of peer disagreement might
be thought to be overly easy and loses its philosophical significance. However, as King
(2012) points out, a perfect case of peer disagreement, namely one which satisfies
both symmetric assumptions, is rather rare. The ultimate goal of the study of peer
disagreement should not be finding a solution that is only applicable to the hardest
cases. If we take it to be the final goal, the study of peer disagreement may be somewhat
trivial as the result is extremely limited. What we should aim for, instead, is finding
out a solution that applies to a wider set of cases.4 Following this line of thought, then,
cases without the symmetry of evidence, though deviant from the standard cases of
peer disagreement, are still worthy discussed.
3 The Conciliatory View and the Equal Weight View
One of the most widely accepted solutions to peer disagreement is the Conciliatory
View: Whenever a disagreement occurs among a group of epistemic peers, each one
involved should make a compromise with the others. The motivation is reasonably
straightforward: Since no one is epistemically impeccable, it is always possible for
an individual to have incorrect credence in a proposition. Thus, when one disagrees
with their epistemic peers, one should realise that they might have made a mistake
and revise their credence in the proposition in doubt. We can perhaps see the plausi-
bility of this view from another perspective. In the face of peer disagreement, a person
who refuses to change their credence can be criticised for ignoring their own fallibil-
ity. To be epistemically modest, one should choose to conciliate when involved in a
disagreement.
A question immediately follows: How, in practice, should one make a conciliation?
Conciliation can be made in many different ways. One can conciliate either by giving
up their credence entirely and accept whatever their peers say, or by making a minimal
revision of their original credence concerning the proposition in question. Although
the two ways lead to remarkably different outcomes, they both count as conciliating.
If the Conciliatory View suggests a variety of ways of dealing with disagreement, it
would be overly general and hence lack significance. Thus, conciliationists cannot
merely claim that conciliation is the proper solution to peer disagreement, but have
to provide precise instructions concerning how people should revise their credence in
the face of disagreement.
One way to establish a more elaborate formulation of the Conciliatory View is to
reconsider the core assumption of peer disagreement. Recall that all the individuals
involved in disagreement are assumed as equally reliable. All their credences concern-
ing the proposition in dispute, therefore, are equally likely to be correct and should be
treated in the same way. Thus, the most promising form of the Conciliatory View is
to assign equal weight to all the disagreeing peers’ credences and take the average as
4 Matheson (2014) also holds the view that the purpose of studying peer disagreement is to find a solution
applicable to other cases.
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the outcome of conciliation. Call this the Equal Weight View (henceforth the EWV).5
Take the Jack the Ripper controversy for example. In the given scenario, Albert is
nearly sure that Aaron Kosminski is the one who committed the Whitechapel mur-
ders, while Bridget is almost certain that Kosminski is not. If Albert adopts the EWV
and assigns equal weight to both his credence and Bridget’s, he would come to have
moderate credence in the proposition under dispute. In the following sections, I will
take the EWV as a view representing other Conciliatory Views since they share all the
important formal properties which we are going to discuss.
The core idea of the EWV, as stated, is to respect the fact that all the individu-
als involved in a genuine peer disagreement are equally reliable. Hence, everyone’s
opinion should be given equal weight. From this core claim, one may infer that the
EWV should be formulated within a Bayesian framework which represents an individ-
ual’s doxastic state as credence.6 To see this, consider a case where three individuals
A, B and C disagree over the truth of a proposition. Both A and B believe that the
proposition is true, while C disbelieves. Suppose that they all adopt the EWV and
intend to revise their credence in the proposition, what would the outcome be? There
is no answer if we adopt the traditional tripartite conception of belief which says that
one either believes, disbelieves or suspends judgement concerning a proposition. The
individuals should not jointly believe or disbelieve the proposition since there is no
consensus among them. The remaining option, namely suspend judgement, is also
incorrect. A joint suspension of judgement concerning the issue implies that C’s dis-
belief outweighs A and B’s beliefs, which leads to a violation of the EWV. If instead
of taking this overly coarse-grained framework, we choose to represent their doxastic
states in terms of credences, this problem can be solved easily. In brief, since credences
can be properly split and represent all the possible outcomes of conciliation, the EWV
should be formulated formally. Following the same line of reasoning, any non-trivial
form of the Conciliatory View is also fundamentally formal.7
Since the EWV is essentially formal, we need to formulate it within a formal
framework. The first item required is the set of all the propositions that can be subject
to disagreement. Take a non-empty finite set of possible worlds Ω as primitive, a
single proposition can be defined as a subset of Ω , which is the set of all the worlds
where the proposition is true. The set of all propositions, following this definition,
should be defined as 2Ω , namely the power set of Ω . An individual’s credence over
each proposition can hence be defined as a function. Let Pri (·) represent the credence
function of individual i which assigns a value in the interval [0, 1] to every possible
world ω in the set Ω , where the sum total of values across the worlds in Ω is 1. As a
direct result, every credence function also assigns a value to every proposition in 2Ω ,
namely the sum of its values for the constituent worlds. Every credence function is
formally a probability function.
5 For a detailed introduction to the EWV, see Feldman (2006), Elga (2007) and Christensen (2007).
6 The EWV can also be formulated in terms of imprecise probability. See Elkin and Wheeler (2018).
7 Kelly (2010, p. 187) has another argument supporting the claim that the EWV should be presented within
a formal framework.
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The most widely accepted version of the EWV takes the linear average of the
disagreeing individuals’ credences as the outcome of conciliation, which can be for-
mulated as the following:
Definition 1 The Linear Equal Weight View
Given a case in which n individuals 1, . . . , n disagree over the proposition P ∈ 2Ω ,
the outcome of conciliation should be
n∑
i=1
1
n
Pri (P).
That is, one may divide the sum of individual credences with the number of individuals
involved and take the outcome as the result of conciliation.
An example may illustrate how the Linear EWV works. Suppose that, in the Jack
the Ripper case, Albert’s credence in Kosminski being Jack the Ripper (P) is 0.9 while
Bridget’s is 0.1. Taking their credence functions respectively as Pr1(·) and Pr2(·), the
result of assigning equal weight to both their credences in P is:
1
2
Pr1(P) + 12 Pr2(P) =
1
2
· 0.1 + 1
2
· 0.9 = 0.5.
According to the Linear EWV, they should have 0.5 credence in Kosminski being the
real murderer. This result correctly captures our intuition that they should both have
moderate credence over P after conciliating with each other.
4 Three formal deficiencies of the Linear Conciliatory View
4.1 Non-commutativity with conditionalisation
Although the Linear EWV seems to be an ideal rule for making conciliation, it has three
major formal deficiencies. First of all, it fails to commute with the Bayesian rule of
conditionalisation. As one of the defining features of Bayesianism, conditionalisation
suggests any individual who acquires a piece of evidence E update their credence by
conditioning their credence in any proposition on E . Apart from being a handy and
plausible rule for updating credence, conditionalisation is also the Bayesian norm for
the diachronic coherence of one’s credences. If one does not update their credence
with the rule of conditionalisation upon receiving new evidence, one takes the risk of
having diachronically incoherent credences over a set of propositions.8
It has been pointed out by many epistemologists that the Linear EWV fails to
commute with conditionalisation as switching the order between conciliating and
updating leads to different outcomes (Fitelson and Jehle 2009; Wilson 2010). To
8 Although the rule of conditionalisation is a core Bayesian norm, it is not undoubtedly true. Some philoso-
phers argue that one may reject conditionalisation yet still be rational (Bacchus et al. 1990; Hild 1998;
Arntzenius 2003). For the projects aiming at vindicating conditionalisation, see Greaves and Wallace (2005),
Briggs and Pettigrew (2020) and Pettigrew (2019).
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Table 1 Albert and Bridget’s
credences over P and E P E Pr1(·) Pr2(·) Pr1+2(·)
T T 0.285 0.05 0.1675
T F 0.615 0.05 0.3325
F T 0.015 0.15 0.0825
F F 0.085 0.75 0.4175
illustrate, consider the Jack the Ripper example. Let Pr1(·) stand for Albert’s credence
function, Pr2(·) for Bridget’s and Pr1+2(·) for their joint credence function obtained
by conciliating with the Linear EWV. Assume that they have the following credences
over the proposition P and a piece of evidence E :
The first row stands for the possible world in which P and E are both true. The value
given by Pr1(·), hence, is Albert’s credence in P&E . Given this credence distribution,
if Albert and Bridget decide to first make a conciliation concerning their credences in
P and E , their joint credence in P&E and E would respectively be the following:
Pr1+2(P&E) = 12 Pr1(P&E) +
1
2
Pr2(P&E) = 12 (0.285 + 0.05) = 0.1675,
Pr1+2(E) = 12 Pr1(E) +
1
2
Pr2(E) = 12 ((0.285 + 0.015) + (0.05 + 0.15)) = 0.25.
By applying the rule of conditionalisation, we may derive their joint credence of P
conditional on E :
Pr1+2(P|E) = Pr1+2(P&E)Pr1+2(E) =
1
2
(Pr1(P&E) + Pr2(P&E))
1
2
(Pr1(E) + Pr2(E))
= 0.1675
0.25
= 0.67.
On the other hand, if Albert and Bridget choose to first update their credences on the
evidence E respectively, they would have the following credences in P conditional
on E :
Pr1(P|E) = Pr1(P&E)Pr1(E) =
0.285
0.3
= 0.95
Pr2(P|E) = Pr2(P&E)Pr2(E) =
0.05
0.2
= 0.25.
If they, after updating with E respectively, make a conciliation, their joint credence
would be the linear average of the two values:
Pr1+2(P|E) = 12 Pr1(P|E) +
1
2
Pr2(P|E)) = 12 (0.95 + 0.25) = 0.6.
This case shows that if the individuals make conciliation with the Linear EWV, the
order of conciliating and updating determines the outcome of their conciliation.
123
Synthese
What is wrong with the Linear EWV failing to commute with conditionalisation?
First, the order of updating and conciliating is, in most cases, irrelevant to the dis-
agreement itself. It is unacceptable to let an irrelevant factor determine the outcome of
conciliation. Suppose that, in the Jack the Ripper case, Albert and Bridget decide to
conciliate with each other and have moderate credence in Kosminski being the mur-
derer. After the conciliation, they find a ledger containing the names of suspects that
they have never seen. Both Albert and Bridget update with this new piece of evidence
and come to have a new credence in Kosminski being the murderer. In a different
case, they find the ledger and each update their credence before they conciliate. Since
conciliation does not commute with conditionalisation, the result of conciliation in the
second case may differ from the result in the first case. This is rather problematic since
the time they receive the ledger is irrelevant to whether Kosminski is Jack the Ripper.
If the purpose of conciliating is to make disagreeing peers come to have credences
that are as close to the truth as possible, we should not take an irrelevant factor into
account. Second, if the outcome of conciliation is sensitive to the time of updating, the
individuals involved in disagreement would be vulnerable to manipulation. Suppose
that, in the Jack the Ripper case, another historian Claire possesses a new piece of
evidence E ′ which is unknown to both Albert and Bridget. Further suppose that Claire
intends the outcome of Albert and Bridget’s conciliation to be as close to 1 as possi-
ble. Knowing that Albert and Bridget are about to conciliate, Claire would choose to
conceal E ′ until the conciliation is made. By revealing E ′ to Albert and Bridget after
they make a conciliation, she can make their joint credence closer to 1, which is the
result she intends. This feature is again undesirable, as an ideal rule should leave no
space for manipulation. In other words, conciliating with the Linear EWV puts people
under the risk of being manipulated. The Linear EWV, therefore, is a problematic way
of resolving peer disagreement.
4.2 Path dependence
Apart from failing to commute with conditionalisation, the Linear EWV also fails to be
path independent (Gardiner 2014). That is, if one makes multiple conciliations accord-
ing to the Linear EWV, the outcome would be sensitive to the order of conciliation.
Imagine a revised Jack the Ripper case in which another historian Claire has credence
0.7 in the proposition P that Kosminski is Jack the Ripper. Suppose, as before, that
Albert’s credence in P is 0.9 while Bridget’s is 0.1. If Albert first makes a conciliation
with Claire and subsequently with Bridget, his credence in P , according to the Linear
EWV, would be 0.45. Let Claire’s credence function be Pr3(·), the process can be
formulated as the following:
Pr1+3(P) = 0.9 + 0.72 = 0.8,
Pr1+3+2(P) = 0.8 + 0.12 = 0.45.
After Albert conciliates with Claire, they obtain the joint credence function P1+3(·)
which assigns P with credence 0.8. When they subsequently make a conciliation with
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Bridget, the resulting credence function is Pr1+3+2(·) which assigns 0.45 to P . In
a slightly different story, Albert first conciliates with Bridget and subsequently with
Claire. His credence in P , given the Linear EWV, would be 0.6. That is,
Pr1+2(P) = 0.9 + 0.12 = 0.5,
Pr1+2+3(P) = 0.5 + 0.72 = 0.6.
Given this example, we may see that the order Albert conciliates with his peers deter-
mines the outcome of conciliation.
Path dependence is undesirable for two reasons. First, the order one makes concilia-
tion with their peers is, in most cases, irrelevant to the proposition in dispute and should
not affect the outcome of conciliation in any way. Consider the Jack the Ripper case
again. Whether Kosminski committed the Whitechapel murders is a historical event
that has already obtained. The temporal order Albert makes conciliation with his peers
has nothing to do with the real identity of Jack the Ripper. Hence, it would be absurd
to let the order Albert conciliates be a factor determining the outcome of conciliation.
Moreover, the result shows that the Linear EWV is diachronically incoherent. The
core claim of the EWV is that every individual’s credence should be treated equally.
If one adopts the Linear EWV and makes conciliation with their peers one at a time,
the testimonies that are received at some early stage would be weighted less than the
testimonies that come later, as earlier testimonies have been mixed up with new testi-
monies for more times. In other words, the importance of a single testimony would be
gradually diluted as new pieces of testimonial evidence emerge. As this result violates
the core idea of the EWV that one should weight all their peers’ credences equally,
the Linear EWV runs the risk of being self-refuting.
One might attempt to defend the Linear EWV by arguing that people can assign
weights in a more sophisticated way. Instead of reassigning equal weight in every
single conciliation, an individual should keep track of all the conciliations they have
made and assign the correct weight to new peers. In the given example, after Albert
conciliates with Bridget, he should be aware of the fact that his credence has already
been mixed up with Bridget’s prior credence. When Albert subsequently meets Claire
and makes another conciliation, he should know that the correct weight to assign to
Claire’s credence is one-third rather than a half. In short, if Albert is smart enough, he
should know the correct weight to assign to his peers’ credence. The problem of path
dependence only occurs to stubborn individuals.
Although the solution is rather convincing, it is difficult to implement in most
cases of peer disagreement. In a simple case which involves only a small number of
individuals, it is relatively easy for one to remember the details of all the conciliations
they have made. However, in a slightly complicated case, it would be overly demanding
to ask an individual to memorise all the details of every conciliation that has taken place.
Suppose that Albert, in the searching of the true identity of Jack the Ripper, consults
twenty peers at different times. It would be extremely tough for him to remember
every peer’s prior credence and assign the correct weight to each of them. Hence, it is
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pragmatically impossible for one to always conciliate with their peers this way.9 For
this reason, path dependence remains a defect of the Linear EWV.
Another way of saving the Linear EWV is to deny that one would ever need to make
multiple conciliations with their peers. In the given scenario, after Albert conciliates
with Bridget, it can be said that Claire is no longer his peer since, after the conciliating
with a peer, Albert’s credence has become more likely to be correct. Hence, Albert is
no longer Claire’s peer and does not have to assign equal weight to her credence. The
problem of path dependence, therefore, would not occur in the first place. However,
this solution is based on a volatile notion of peerhood. In any ordinary case of peer
disagreement, one does not become superior immediately after they conciliate with a
single peer. Imagine a case where a panel of scientists aims to make a joint decision
concerning government policies. Two among them have a private conversation and,
right after they make a conciliation, announce that their credence over the proposition
in question is the correct one since they have become superior to all other scientists.
If one agrees that this case is absurd, they would have to admit that a proper notion of
peerhood should prevent this kind of things from happening. For this reason, we may
conclude that path dependence remains a shortcoming of the EWV.
4.3 The problem of independence preservation
Another crucial problem of the Linear Conciliatory View is that it fails to preserve
their judgement of independence (Bradley et al. 2014; Elkin and Wheeler 2018). Let
us consider a concrete example provided by Elkin and Wheeler (2018): Albert, based
on his evidence, does not find it likely that it will rain in Kyoto tomorrow (K ) and has
0.2 credence in the proposition. On the other hand, with some evidence, he thinks that
there may be an unpublished volume of The Lord of the Rings (R) and has 0.4 credence
in its existence. Based on the same background knowledge and evidence, Bridget has
0.6 credence in the former proposition and 0.55 in the latter. Further suppose that
Albert judges K and R as mutually independent. His credence in the conjunction of K
and R, thus, is equal to the product of his credence in K and his credence in R, namely
0.16. Bridget also judges K and R as mutually independent and has 0.33 credence in
the conjunction of K and R. When they conciliate with each other according to the
Linear EWV, they come to accept a new credence function Pr1+2(·) which does not
assign equal value to the conjunction of K and R and the product of their respective
joint credence in K and R. That is, K and R are not independent according to their
joint credence function Pr1+2(·). The distribution of their credences is presented in
Table 2.10
Intuitively, this result is strange. As both Albert and Bridget judge K and R as
mutually independent, the joint judgement that K and R are relevant, revealed by the
joint credence function Pr1+2(·), comes from nowhere. A more serious problem is
that failing to preserve ones’ judgement of independence may make them irrational.
Suppose that Albert and Bridget do make conciliation according to the Linear EWV
and adopt Pr1+2(·) as their new credence function. A witty gambler can sell them two
9 Gardiner (2014) provides a thorough review of the possible solutions to this problem.
10 Thanks to an anonymous referee for indicating that this problem should be discussed.
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Table 2 Albert (Pr1(·)) and Bridget’s (Pr2(·)) credences in K and R
Pr1(· ∧ ·) Pr2(· ∧ ·) Pr1+2(· ∧ ·) Pr1+2(·)Pr1+2(·)
K , R 0.08 0.33 0.205 0.19
K ,¬R 0.12 0.27 0.195 0.21
¬K , R 0.32 0.22 0.27 0.285
¬K ,¬R 0.48 0.18 0.33 0.315
bets: The first bet costs them $20.5 on the condition that they receive $100 from the
gambler if K and R are both true. The second bet costs them $33 on the condition
that the gambler pays them $100 if K and R are both false. Since, according to the
function Pr1+2(· ∧ ·), Albert and Bridget’s joint credence in both K and R being true
is 0.205, the expected return of the first bet for them is 0. Similarly, since their joint
credence in K and R both being false is 0.33, the expected return of the second bet is
also 0. As both bets are fair for Albert and Bridget, they will accept both bets.
The gambler can go further and sell Albert and Bridget two other bets: One costs
them $21 and pays back $100 if K is true and R is false. Another costs them $28.5
and pays back $100 if K is false and R is true. Since both Albert and Bridget judge
K and R as independent, their credence in K and R can also be represented by the
function Pr1+2(·)Pr1+2(·). Given this credence function, the two new bets are fair.
Hence, Albert and Bridget would also accept this proposal. With the four bets, it is
guaranteed that Albert and Bridget are going to lose $3 to the gambler. This case shows
that adopting the Linear EWV may lead to a sure loss of money, which indicates that
the individuals are irrational. The linear EWV, therefore, should be abandoned.
5 Opinion pooling and peer disagreement
One way of saving the Conciliatory View is to change the way we conciliate while
retaining the core idea that one should make conciliation with their peers. Since it
has been proved that there are nonlinear average functions that are free from the three
formal problems, we may adopt the nonlinear average functions to make conciliation
and thereby derive alternative Conciliatory Views that are free from the three formal
deficiencies.11
The study of probabilistic opinion pooling aims to answer one central question:
Given a profile of credence functions across a set of individuals, what is the proper
way of merging them into a single joint credence function which satisfies specific
requirements? To correctly respond to this question, philosophers have examined a
variety of possibilities and proposed different pooling functions. Since, as we have
seen, the Conciliatory View is essentially formal, we may apply the results in the
study of opinion pooling to save this view. In the following sections, I will show that
nonlinear average functions are free from the three formal deficiencies of the Linear
11 This idea is first proposed by Martini et al. (2013). However, they did not fully explore the possible
outcomes of adopting nonlinear functions to make conciliation.
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EWV. As the formal results derived can be generalised to other forms of conciliation,
the Conciliatory View can be rescued.
It has been proven that the geometric averaging does commute with conditionali-
sation (Genest 1984). Hence, we may adopt geometric averaging to make conciliation
and thereby derive a rule of conciliation that commutes with conditionalisation:
Definition 2 The Geometric Conciliatory View
Given a case in which n individuals 1, . . . , n disagree over the proposition P , the
Geometric Conciliatory View suggests the individuals involved to have credence
∑
ω∈P
c · Pr1(ω)w1 · · · Prn(ω)wn
in the proposition P , where the factors w1, . . . , wn are the weights assigned to each
individual which sum up to 1, and the constant c is a normalisation factor which
guarantees that the sum of joint credences across all worlds equals 1:
c = 1∑
ω′∈Ω Pr1(ω′)w1 · · · Prn(ω′)wn
.
A technical point to be highlighted is that the credence functions here take a single
possible world, rather than a proposition, as its input.12 The credence each individual
has in a proposition can be derived by summing up the credence over each possible
worlds included in the proposition.13
To show that the Geometric Conciliatory View does commute with conditionali-
sation, we need to reformulate the rule of conditionalisation.14 Given any piece of
evidence E , the information it carries allows the individuals to derive a likelihood
function L which assigns either the value 1 or 0 to each possible world, represent-
ing the degree E supports each world ω. For example, if a world ωk is in E , then
L(ωk) = 1. An individual i can then update their credence function P as
Pr Li (ω) =
Pri (ω)L(ω)∑
ω′∈Ω Pri (ω′)L(ω′)
which is equivalent to
Pr Ei (ω) =
Pri (ω)Pri (E |ω)∑
ω′∈Ω Pri (ω′)Pri (E |ω′)
.
Since this formula is the rule of conditionalisation in a different form, updating with
a likelihood function is equivalent to updating with conditionalisation.
12 This is in line with the definition that each credence function assigns a value to each possible world.
13 For a detailed explanation, see Dietrich and List (2016, p. 8).
14 The likelihood function, compared to Bayesian conditionalisation, is actually a more general update rule,
as it can take any possible value, rather than the discrete values 1 and 0. From this perspective, Bayesian
conditionalisation is a limiting case of updating by a likelihood function. See Dietrich and List (2016).
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With the new form of conditionalisation, we can now show that the Geometric
Conciliatory View commutes with conditionalisation. Take Pr LPr1,...,Prn (·) as the joint
credence function obtained in the case where the individuals first conciliate with all
others and subsequently update with a likelihood function L . PrPr L1 ,...,Pr Ln (·), on the
other hand, stands for the joint credence function obtained in the case where the indi-
viduals first update with the likelihood function L(·) and then conciliate with the
others. To show that the two functions yield the same outcome, it suffices to show
that the two functions are proportional since any two probability functions that are
proportional to one another must be identical. Consider the case in which the indi-
viduals make a conciliation first. Suppose there are n individuals who disagree over
their credence of a single possible world ω. If they adopt the Geometric Conciliatory
View and make a conciliation, the result would be Pr1(ω)w1 · · · Prn(ω)wn . When they
jointly receive a piece of evidence E and derive a likelihood function L(·) from it,
the outcome of updating would then be proportional to Pr1(ω)w1 · · · Prn(ω)wn L(ω).
On the other hand, when the individuals first update their credence functions with
L(·), we have a set of updated credence functions Pr Li (ω). Each function in the
set is equivalent to Pri (ω)L(ω). The individuals later conciliate with the oth-
ers and get the result (Pr1(ω)L(ω))w1 · · · (Prn(ω)L(ω))wn , which is equivalent to
Pr1(ω)w1 · · · Prn(ω)wn · L(ω)w1+···+wn . Since w1, . . . , wn sum up to one, this result
is proportional to Pr1(ω)w1 · · · Prn(ω)wn L(ω), namely the result in the first case.
We may hence conclude that the Geometric Conciliatory View does commute with
conditionalisation.15
The problem of path dependence can be solved by adopting the Multiplicative
Conciliatory View which suggests individuals to conciliate with multiplicative aver-
aging:16
Definition 3 The Multiplicative Conciliatory View
Given a case in which n individuals 1, . . . , n disagree over the proposition P , the
Multiplicative EWV suggests the individuals involved to have credence
∑
w∈P
c · Pr1(ω) · · · Prn(ω)
in the proposition P . The constant c is a normalisation factor which guarantees that
the sum of joint credences of all propositions equals to 1.
c = 1∑
ω′∈Ω Pr1(ω′) · · · Prn(ω′)
.
Two points should be noted: First, the Multiplicative Conciliatory View, like the Geo-
metric Conciliatory View, also takes a single world as the input instead of a proposition.
15 This simplified proof is presented by Dietrich and List (2016). The original proof that geometric averaging
commutes with conditionalisation is provided by Genest (1984).
16 Dietrich (2010) and Easwaran et al. (2016) both provide detailed analysis of the features of the multi-
plicative average function.
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Second, this view assigns equal weight to all the credence functions involved. Hence,
we do not have to explicitly assign weight to each credence function.
It need not be proved that the Multiplicative Conciliatory View is path independent.
Since multiplication is associative, it trivially holds that any conciliation made this
way is also associative.17 The problem of path dependence, hence, would not occur
for anyone conciliating with the Multiplicative Conciliatory View.18
Both the Geometric EWV and the Multiplicative EWV preserve one’s judgement
that two events are independent. The proof is also trivial. According to both the Geo-
metric and the Multiplicative Conciliatory View, individuals should multiply their
credences to make conciliation. Hence, the joint credence function of a group of peers
assigns a value which is equivalent to the product of the credences of each individ-
ual. The problem of independence preservation can thus be solved. This point can be
illustrated with a toy example: Consider a case involving two peers whose credences
are represented respectively by the function Pr1(·) and Pr2(·). Let their joint cre-
dence function be Pr1+2(·). To show that both the Geometric and the Multiplicative
Conciliatory View preserve their judgement that two propositions are independent,
what we need to prove is that Pr1+2(· ∧ ·) is equivalent to Pr1+2(·)Pr1+2(·) when
the inputs are independent. According to the definition of the Geometric and the
Multiplicative Conciliatory View, Pr1+2(· ∧ ·) is equivalent to Pr1(· ∧ ·)Pr2(· ∧ ·).
When the inputs are independent for both individuals, Pr1+2(· ∧ ·) is equivalent to
Pr1(·)Pr1(·)Pr2(·)Pr2(·). Since this formula is equivalent to Pr1+2(·)Pr1+2(·), one’s
judgement that two propositions are independent can be well preserved.
In sum, the three formal deficiencies of the Linear EWV can be solved respectively
by making conciliation with different nonlinear average functions. Since the proofs
do not assume that all credence function involved are assigned with equal weight,
the same formal result holds for every possible weight distribution. The Conciliatory
View, hence, is free from the three formal deficiencies.
6 Other features of nonlinear conciliation
Although switching to nonlinear average functions may save the Conciliatory View
from the three formal deficiencies, there is a standing worry that both nonlinear
average functions introduced are far from ideal. Despite the Geometric Conciliatory
View commutes with conditionalisation, it is still path dependent. The Multiplicative
Conciliatory View, on the contrary, is path independent but not commutative with con-
ditionalisation. Also, it should be noted that both nonlinear Conciliatory Views fail to
be eventwise independent. That is, if we adopt the nonlinear Conciliatory Views, the
17 One may wonder whether the process of normalisation makes the Multiplicative Conciliatory View path
dependent. To show that it does not, it suffices to show that the normalisation factors do not vary with the
path. Consider a toy example in which Pr1(ω) = α, Pr2(ω) = β and Pr3(ω) = γ . Given the Multiplicative
Conciliatory View, one may obtain the result that Pr1+2(ω) = c ·αβ and Pr1+2+3(ω) = c′ ·c ·αβγ where
c and c′ stand respectively for the normalisation factor at each stage of conciliation. If we change the order
of conciliation, we may derive the final result Pr1+3+2(ω) = c′′ ·c′′′ ·αβγ . By expanding the normalisation
factors, one can see that c · c′ is equivalent to c′′ · c′′′. We may see that the process of normalisation does
not make the Multiplicative Conciliatory View path dependent.
18 Easwaran et al. (2016, p. 16) provides a different proof to show the same result.
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collective credences of a group do not depend solely on the conciliating individuals’
credences of the proposition but would be influenced by some other factors, such as
the content of the agenda (Aczél and Wagner 1980; McConway 1981; Stewart and
Quintana 2018; Dietrich and List 2016).19 Since no average function is perfect, some
might still consider the Conciliatory View untenable.
This worry does not undermine the current approach but instead motivates us to
embrace a pluralistic conception of conciliation. Since there does not exist a perfect
average function which is applicable in every case, we should, in each specific case,
adopt the average function that is most likely to avoid potential problems. For instance,
if I am involved in a disagreement where I am sure that no further conciliation would
take place but some new evidence may appear, I should adopt the Geometric Concil-
iatory View. By doing so, I can guarantee that the time I receive the evidence does
not determine the outcome of conciliation. Similarly, if I know that someone owns the
power of changing the agenda and I do not want the result of conciliation to be manip-
ulated by the agenda setter, I should adopt the Linear Conciliatory View. The next step
the conciliationists should take, therefore, is to create a taxonomy of disagreements.
By attentively categorising various cases of disagreement, we may apply the right rule
of conciliation when a disagreement occurs. The primary aim of this section, hence, is
to demonstrate some features of the Geometric and Multiplicative EWV and specify
the conditions under which they should be applied.20
To see other features of different average functions, we should first compare the
outcomes of adopting different average functions in a simple scenario. Suppose one
has 0.5 credence in a proposition and conciliates with a peer whose credence is x .21 The
outcomes of one’s conciliation according to different average functions can be seen
in Fig. 1. The value on the x axis stands for one’s peer’s credence in the proposition
under dispute, while the value on the y axis stands for the outcome of conciliation.
The solid and dotted lines respectively represent the result of adopting the Linear and
Multiplicative EWV, while the S-curve represents the Geometric EWV.
19 A practical consequence of adopting the nonlinear Conciliatory Views is that the result of conciliation
would be partly determined by the agenda, namely the set of propositions people disagree on. Since the
nonlinear average functions are not eventwise independent, the joint credence a group has in a proposition
may differ under different agendas. See McConway (1981) for the proof that linear averaging is the only
function which satisfies the requirement of being eventwise independent. Adopting nonlinear Conciliatory
Views, thus, makes the conciliating individuals vulnerable to manipulation by the agenda setters. An agenda
setter may decide their joint credences in propositions by setting the agenda in a specific way. The reason is
that given different agendas, the underlying set of worlds may change. Imagine a panel of climate scientists
negotiating about a set of propositions on an agenda with the intention to decide their joint credences over
the propositions. When someone expands the agenda with one more proposition, say whether there will be
a hurricane next year, each world ω in the underlying set of possible worlds Ω would have to be replaced
by two worlds: one which is a combination of ω and there being hurricanes next year, and another which
combines ω and there being no hurricane next year. If one adopts the nonlinear Conciliatory Views, a
change of agenda may lead to different outcomes of conciliation. Hence, the agenda setter may manipulate
the result by setting the agenda in a specific way. This is another unacceptable result since, as indicated
before, an ideal rule of conciliation should not leave space for manipulation.
20 For the sake of simplicity, here I consider different EWVs, rather than different Conciliatory Views. The
formal properties of different EWVs can be generalised to other forms of the Conciliatory View.
21 It should be noted that one having a credence of a proposition is an abbreviation of one having a set of
credences in the worlds where the proposition is true.
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The Linear EWV, compared to the other two average functions, is the most resolute
one since the disagreeing individuals who adopt this view never defer, in any sense,
to each other. What they do is just split the difference between their credences.
The Multiplicative EWV generates a different result in this case. When one has 0.5
credence in a proposition and conciliates with their peer according to the Multiplicative
EWV, the outcome would always equal to their peer’s credence. That is, one always
completely yields to their peer.22
The outcome of adopting the Geometric EWV is the most intriguing. It behaves
like the Linear EWV when the peer’s credence is moderate, but gradually deviates
from the Linear EWV as the peer’s credence gets close to the extreme. To be precise,
when the peer’s credence is below 0.1 or above 0.9, the slope of the tangent line
of the curve exceeds 1. This feature implies that when one has moderate credence
in a proposition and adopts the Geometric EWV, one would be inclined to yield to
their peer when the peer is strongly opinionated on the issue. On the other hand,
when they both have moderate credences, the outcome of conciliation stays moderate.
Here, we have a rather interesting discovery: Based on the Geometric EWV, we can
derive an objective threshold for credences that are high and low for an individual.
In the case where one has 0.5 credence, the outcome of conciliation is closer to their
peer’s credence when their peer has credence above 0.9 or below 0.1. One possible
interpretation is that, given the Geometric EWV, a credence around 0.9 is objectively
high for someone who has 0.5 credence in the same proposition. Similarly, a credence
below 0.1 is objectively low for that individual. Epistemologists sometimes take 0.9 as
the threshold for credences being significantly high. The Geometric EWV generates
exactly this result.
Figure 2 presents a case in which one’s credence in the proposition under dispute is
0.9, while their peer’s credence is again x . In this case, the Linear and the Geometric
EWV behave in the same way, while the outcome of adopting the Multiplicative EWV
is significantly different. When both the individual and their peer have 0.9 credence
in the proposition, the outcome of conciliation, given the Multiplicative EWV, would
22 Easwaran et al. (2016) also mentioned this result.
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Fig. 2 Individual with credence
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be greater than 0.9. This is a property (Easwaran et al. 2016) call synergy. When both
the individuals’ credences are high, the outcome would be even higher. Because of
this property, the result generated by the Multiplicative EWV, compared to the other
two EWVs, is always closer to the extreme.
What, then, is the correct way of making conciliation? Should one adopt the Geo-
metric EWV and make a radical change of credence only when the peer is strongly
opinionated? Or, should one adopt the Multiplicative EWV and sometimes completely
surrender to the peer? As previously indicated, one should pick the EWV which is free
from foreseeable problems. Moreover, a general guideline is to pick the rule according
to how resolute one wants to be. As I point out, the Linear EWV, compared to the other
two, is the most unwavering one. Individuals who adopt this view never completely
surrender to their peers. The Multiplicative EWV, as we have seen, is the least resilient
among the three, as it makes the individuals yield to their peers more frequently than
any other views. Bearing this feature in mind, one may, in each specific scenario,
choose the one that best suits the case.
One may think that in a standard case of peer disagreement, there is a perfect
symmetry between the disagreeing individuals. Hence, the individuals involved should
never yield to the others’ opinion, which implies that the Linear EWV is the only
acceptable option. In fact, even in these cases, one may choose to be less resilient
about their credence. Here I want to highlight two factors that are crucial in deciding
which EWV to adopt. One is the strength of the evidence one possesses which decides
how resilient their credence is. The stronger their evidence is, the more unwilling one
is to revise their credence. Another factor is the extent the evidence is shared. The
more one knows about their peers’ evidence before the conciliation, the more likely
that one retains their original credence.23 This point can be illustrated by considering
the case in which the individuals do not share their evidence. If one does not know
whether their peer has evidence concerning a proposition, when one realises that their
peer has some credence different from their own, one should be able to infer that their
23 As noted before, although deviate from the standard cases of disagreement in the literature, cases in
which the individuals do not share all their evidence are still worth discussing. See Matheson (2014).
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peer does have some evidence. One may hence be inclined to defer to their peer. If
one knows all the evidence their peer possesses, there is no reason to defer. With the
two factors explained, we may see how different EWVs capture these intuitions.
Case 1 An individual has no evidence concerning a proposition p and has 0.5 credence
in it.24 They do not know if their peer has any evidence.
When the individual realises that their peer has different credence in the same
proposition and hence disagrees with their, it is reasonable for them to think that their
peer has better evidence and come up with more definite credence. In this case, one
should completely defer to their peer. The Multiplicative EWV generates the correct
result in this specific circumstance.
Case 2 An individual has some evidence concerning a proposition p and has 0.5 cre-
dence in it. They know that their peer has some evidence, but do not know the strength
of their peer’s evidence.
When the individual realises that their peer’s credence is not radically different
from theirs, they could conciliate by moderately deferring to their peer. If one finds
out that their peer’s credence is very strong, they may realise that their peer’s evidence
must be rather conclusive. After all, they are equally good in evaluating the strength
of the evidence they each possess. Hence, they should yield to their peer. Adopting
the Geometric EWV generates the correct result.
One possible challenge to the solution is that their peer might come to have high
credence with some weak evidence. If it is so, then it would be wrong for the individual
to defer to their peer. However, by assuming the peerhood between them, this kind
of cases should not occur. That is, a genuine epistemic peer would not come to have
high credence based on insufficient evidence. True epistemic peers should be equally
careful in evaluating the evidence available to them.
Apart from the two factors, there are some other important aspects that should be
considered when choosing the proper rule for conciliation.
6.1 Joint decisionmaking
The purpose of conciliation should be taken as a crucial factor in choosing the rule. On
some occasions, the primary purpose of conciliation is to come up with a joint decision
on whether to take a certain action. These cases are called action-disagreement. Dif-
ferent from belief-disagreement, a true resolution of an action-disagreement is an all
or nothing thing, namely that the individuals involved either take action or not. There
is no middle ground between the two options. Hence, an ideal rule of conciliation
for an action-disagreement should be one which helps the individuals arriving at a
consensus about whether to take action. Recall that the Multiplicative EWV has the
feature of synergy, namely that one’s credence enhances another if they point to the
same direction. Because of this feature, when all the individuals’ credences are above
24 It should be noted that I do not intend to imply that whenever one has no evidence concerning a
proposition, one comes to have 0.5 credence over that proposition.
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0.5, the outcome of conciliation with the Multiplicative EWV, compared to the other
rules of conciliation, would be much closer to 1. Similarly, when all the individuals’
credences are below 0.5, the outcome of adopting the Multiplicative EWV would be
very close to 0. We may, therefore, see that synergy makes it more likely for a group
to form a consensus on whether to act. Compared to the unanimity preserving Linear
EWV, the Multiplicative EWV better tackles cases of action-disagreement.
6.2 Polarisation
A phenomenon that worries many social epistemologists is belief polarisation. Con-
sider a case where two individuals disagree about a controversial fact. When they are
both exposed to some pieces of evidence concerning the disputed fact, it is natural for
one to expect that the disagreement between them to be mitigated. However, empiri-
cal studies have shown that such expectation differs from what happens in reality.25
When the individuals are presented with evidence of a mixed character, they tend to
strengthen their prior credence on the controversy. That is, one who believes that the
disputed fact obtains would become even more certain about the fact, while the other
one behaves in precisely the opposite way. Hence, sharing evidence may lead to an
increase in the difference between their credences.
Polarisation gets even more severe when we escalate to the level of group disagree-
ment. Suppose that two groups disagree over a proposition p. Members of group A
believe that p is more likely to be true than not, while members of group B believe
the opposite. When the members of the two groups are exposed to some evidence
concerning p, it can be expected that the two groups become more polarised than
two individuals. First, what happens in the individual level would occur again: the
members of A come to have stronger credence in p, while members of B revise their
credences in the opposite way. Second, since the members are now grouped with others
who share similar ideas, they would communicate with others and consolidate their
credence over the disputed proposition. The two mechanisms make belief polarisation
even more intense at the group level.
With the phenomenon of belief polarisation explained, we may now ask the ques-
tion: Which rule should one adopt when the members of group A intends to come up
with a joint credence over p? The Multiplicative EWV is a bad option as its result is
comparatively extreme.26 Suppose that group A consists of four members. After being
exposed to the evidence, half of the members have 0.7 credence in p while another
half have 0.8. Adopting the Multiplicative EWV, the outcome of their conciliation
would be approximately 0.99. Since this result is much higher than each of their prior
credence, the difference between the joint credence of group A and group B becomes
greater. Polarisation is further intensified with no substantial reason.
The Geometric EWV performs slightly better in this case. If members of group A
conciliate with the geometric EWV, the outcome would be approximately 0.78, which
25 See Kelly (2008) and Sunstein (2017) for a full-fledged discussion about polarisation.
26 Here I assume that the members of a group do not come up with their credences independently. If they
do, the Multiplicative EWV can be a good option for them to derive their joint credence as their credences
can be amplified.
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is not very distant from their original credence. However, the Geometric EWV has
the feature that when one of the members is strongly opinionated, others tend to defer
to their credence. When one of the members have very high credence, the outcome
would be dragged toward their credence. Hence, adopting the Geometric EWV may
still heighten polarisation in certain situations.
The Linear EWV, compared to the nonlinear ones, is the most conservative rule
of conciliation. In cases where people have a strong intention to avoid polarisation,
the Linear EWV is the appropriate one to adopt. In sum, both the Geometric and
the Multiplicative EWV run the risk of intensifying polarisation. Anyone involved in
a disagreement which may lead to polarisation should be aware of the outcome of
adopting a rule of conciliation.
Although there are still many other cases that could be discussed, the conclusion
I would like to draw has been clearly illustrated by reviewing these possible cases of
disagreement. There are cases where one should conditionally defer to their peers.
Yet there are also cases where one should not defer in any sense. We may therefore
conclude that there is no ultimately correct method of making conciliation. The deci-
sion concerning the average function one is supposed to apply must be based upon the
specific situation one is involved.
7 Conclusion
The formal deficiencies of the Conciliatory View, as we have seen, stem from the mis-
conception that there is only one way, namely linear averaging, that could be adopted
to make conciliation. By selecting alternative average functions to make conciliation,
the problems dissolve naturally.
Conciliating in a nonlinear way leads to some intriguing results. The most prominent
one is that an individual may assign equal weight to all their epistemic peers yet makes
a minimal revision of their own credence. If we interpret the weight one assigns to their
peers as the extent one trusts the peers, we may derive the result that an individual
can fully respect their peers’ competence in a subject matter, but still retain their
credence concerning the proposition in question. From this result, we may see that
previous discussion concerning the Equal Weight View and the Conciliatory View are
misguided. Before we argue whether we should conciliate, we should elaborate on the
notion of conciliation we are using.
The study of different kinds of conciliation motivates us to embrace a pluralistic
conception of conciliation. What we should do, hence, is to construct a taxonomy of
disagreements carefully. By correctly sorting different cases, we may apply the right
function to make conciliation for each case. The discussion over whether to conciliate
makes sense only when we are talking about the best way of making conciliation.
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